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We show that quantum interference can be classically interpreted in terms of a phase invariant
quantity, not unlike the Berry’s phase. Under this interpretation, closed loops in time become
fundamental quantum entities, and all quantum states become periodic. Decoherence is then seen
to occur naturally as a consequence. This formalism, although counterintuitive, provides a useful
way of assigning “classical” meaning to quantum probabilities.
INTRODUCTION
To many, quantum interference (QI) is the most myste-
rious aspect of quantum mechanics; in Feynman’s words,
it “contains the only mystery” [1]. The implication is
that all of the non-intuitive aspects of quantum me-
chanics (such as wave-particle duality, non-commuting
observables, the EPR “paradox” [2], or Bell’s inequal-
ity [3]) are manifestations of a single non-classical phe-
nomenon, namely QI. It has become common to follow
Feynman’s lead and say that there is no way to explain
QI in a “classical way” [1]; by this it is meant that QI in-
volves probabilities (cross-terms) that seemingly do not
appear in classical probability theory. However, recent
work [4] has shown that certain decidedly classical sys-
tems can exhibit superficially non-classical probabilities
and pseudo-QI effects. Thus it becomes natural to re-
examine QI in an attempt to assign a classical meaning
to non-classical terms. Clearly, an understanding of why
such non-classical probabilities show up in quantum sys-
tems is important in developing any meaningful inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics itself. In the words of
Mermin, “an acceptable notion of probabilities as objec-
tive properties of individual systems” may “sweep all the
puzzles of quantum mechanics” under the rug [5].
Part of the perceived difficulty in interpreting quantum
mechanics lies in the structure of quantum mechanics:
what concepts, if any, should be considered fundamental?
For example, are state vectors more fundamental than
operators? At first the question seems moot, since the
Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures are mathematically
equivalent (up to a change of basis). But consider that
all observables correspond to Hermitian operators: does
this mean that such operators have a special place in the
hierarchy of quantum ideas?
The concept of the Berry’s phase (BP) [6] has shed new
light onto such philosophical questions. In 1984 Berry
showed that although the phase of a given state vector
(ket) cannot have physical meaning, a phase invariant
quantity (now called the Berry’s phase) can always be
constructed in the Hilbert space of the state vectors, and
this phase is measurable. Berry’s idea came as a reve-
lation in the mid-1980’s, for the standard dogma of the
time was that for a quantity to be measurable, it must
be the eigenvalue of some Hermitian operator. Berry
showed that Berry’s phase is measurable, but occurs as
a result of the topology of the Hilbert space in which the
BP resides. Hence there are no operators that can be
associated with the BP. In Resta’s words, Berry’s phase
is an “exotic” observable [7]. Being observable, then, is
there any reason to place the BP on par with state vec-
tors and/or Hermitian operators as quantum mechanical
constructs?
BERRY’S PHASE
Berry’s phase is usually introduced within the context
of a quantum system governed by a parametric Hamil-
tonian H(x) [7]. (This idea is convenient for didactic
purposes, but is not required for the BP to manifest it-
self.) For now we will define the BP as a phase shift
in a system’s state vector |Ψ(x)〉 that appears after the
system has traced a closed loop in the space of some pa-
rameter x. Consider a system that evolves cyclically as
|Ψ(x1)〉 → |Ψ(x2)〉 → |Ψ(x3)〉 → |Ψ(x1)〉. (We will re-
fer to this ordered sequence of states as a “path” even
though it involves a discrete number of states. The path
is considered closed because the final state of the system
is the same as the initial state.) For this path the BP (γ)
is defined to be [7]
γ = −Im ln[〈Ψ(x1)|Ψ(x3)〉
〈Ψ(x3)|Ψ(x2)〉〈Ψ(x2)|Ψ(x1)〉]. (1)
The most important feature of this definition is that γ is
phase invariant (sometimes called “gauge invariant”). By
this we mean that individual phase choices for particular
kets don’t matter; the BP still comes out the same for
a given path. This can be seen by making the “gauge
transformations” |Ψ(x1)〉 → e
iθ1 |Ψ(x1)〉, |Ψ(x2)〉 →
eiθ2 |Ψ(x2)〉, |Ψ(x3)〉 → e
iθ3 |Ψ(x3)〉 and recalculating γ.
Because it is invariant to phase choice, the discrete
BP (and its continuum limit counterpart) is a measur-
able quantity. For example, in systems of Bloch elec-
trons the presence of the BP is seen as either an electron
self-interference effect ([8],[9]) or as a half-integer quan-
tum Hall effect[10]. The BP appears in these particular
systems because of the torus topology of the Brillouin
2zone; k’s (Bloch pseudomomenta) that differ by a recip-
rocal lattice vector are considered equal. Similarly, in all
other situations in which a BP appears (electric polar-
ization [11], spin-wave dynamics [12], or even molecular
machines [13]) the state vectors traverse a closed loop in
the space of some parameter. The importance of such
closed loops motivates further research into placing the
BP into the structure of quantum theory.
QUANTUM PROBABILITIES
Recent work [14] has shown that there is a link be-
tween the BP and quantum probability. Specifically, in
employing a consistent histories [15] formulation of quan-
tum mechanics, one finds that the BP becomes “the main
building block of the decoherence functional” [14], which
itself contains complete information about a quantum
system. Put another way, for each quantum mechan-
ical history there can be associated (mapped) a unique
BP. The authors of [14] show that “all physically relevant
amplitudes” are based on the BP, and conclude that the
presence of complex phases leads to non-classical proba-
bility terms (i.e. QI). We do not disagree with this result
but suggest that there is a way to interpret QI classically,
if one is willing to accept a paradigm shift in analyzing
quantum transitions.
For the purposes of our discussion, we will define QI
through an examination of probability. We say that a
system involves classical probability if the system always
obeys the addition law [16]
P (A1 ∪ A2) = P (A1) + P (A2), (2)
with A1 and A2 being mutually exclusive events, and
P (A1 ∪ A2) being the union of these events. In con-
trast, quantum systems are immediately identifiable by
the presence of equalities such as
P (A1 ∪ A2) = P (A1) + P (A2) + f(P (A1), P (A2)), (3)
where f(P (A1), P (A2)) is, in general, non-zero. In anal-
ogy with the mathematics of interfering waves, we call
terms like f(P (A1), P (A2)) “interference terms” [1].
Note that this definition of classical probability is an
operational one; we do not enter into any debate between
frequentists and Bayesians [17] as to the epistemological
meaning of probability. Nor do we refer to past and/or
future events in order to give meaning to probabilities,
as some have done (e.g. [18]). Our goal is simply to
show that quantum interference terms become classically
explicable (and hence cease to be “interference” terms at
all) if one looks at “closed loops in time” as fundamental
quantum entities.
PRODUCT OF AMPLITUDES
We represent state vectors by kets in a complex vec-
tor space. In such a space |Ψ〉 and eiθ|Ψ〉 are said to
correspond to the same physical state, since they lead
to identical expectation values for identical Hermitian
operators. Now consider two distinct states |Ψ1〉 and
|Ψ2〉. The inner product φ21 ≡ 〈Ψ2|Ψ1〉 is called a prob-
ability amplitude, since the probability of the transition
Ψ1 → Ψ2 is taken to be |〈Ψ2|Ψ1〉|
2. Since φ21 ∈ C, we
can write the amplitude in modulus/phase form as
φ21 = r21e
−iθ21 . (4)
The phase difference θ21 = −Im ln〈Ψ2|Ψ1〉 is not a
“Berry’s phase” since we do not yet have a closed loop.
Now assume that we have three states that evolve cycli-
cally, and calculate the (phase invariant) BP as in equa-
tion 1. In terms of amplitudes, we have
γ = −Im lnφ13 φ32 φ21. (5)
Because the BP is independent of phase choice, so too is
the product of amplitudes φ13 φ32 φ21. This suggests the
definition
Γ ≡ φ1N · · · φ32φ21 =
N∏
n=1
φi+1,i, (6)
where it is understood that the loop eventually closes
upon itself so that N + 1 → 1. So defined, Γ is not a
phase, but (like the BP) it is phase invariant; moreover,
Γ (what we call a “product of amplitudes”) will appear
naturally in quantum systems.
To see how this is so, we make the following observa-
tion: the probability of going from an initial state |i〉 to
a final state |f〉 is the sum of all the Γ’s that include |i〉
and |f〉. Explicitly,
Pfi =
∑
S
Γ(S), (7)
where the S’s represent all possible closed paths that
include |i〉 and |f〉. For example, suppose a state |i〉 goes
to a state |f〉 via only one possible (intermediate) route
|1〉:
|i〉 → |1〉 → |f〉. (8)
Traditionally we would write, for the amplitude of an
|i〉 → |f〉 transition via |1〉,
〈f |i〉 = 〈f |1〉〈1|i〉 = φf1 φ1i ≡ φfi,1, (9)
so that the probability of such a transition is simply
Pfi = |φfi,1|
2. By our “Γ-rule”, we get the same result:
there is only one possible closed loop,
|i〉 → |1〉 → |f〉 → |1〉 → |i〉, (10)
3and we get for the total probability
Pfi = 〈i|1〉〈1|f〉〈f |1〉〈1|i〉 = φ
∗
fi,1φfi,1 = |φfi,1|
2, (11)
as before. (Note that there are not yet any interference
terms as in equation 3.) We resist the temptation at this
point to interpret the meaning of such a closed loop; for
now we consider it a convenient mathematical device.
To get interference, we require there to be two means
to go from |i〉 to |f〉: via |1〉 or |2〉. Traditionally, one
finds that
〈f |i〉 = 〈f |1〉〈1|i〉+ 〈f |2〉〈2|i〉, (12)
giving a probability of
Pfi = |φfi,1|
2 + |φfi,1|
2 + φfi,1φ
∗
fi,2 + φ
∗
fi,1φfi,2 (13)
for the |i〉 to |f〉 transition.
Observe that interference terms are now present: these
are the “mixed” terms φfi,1φ
∗
fi,2, and φ
∗
fi,1φfi,2. These
are the terms that supposedly have no “classical” inter-
pretation. Indeed, if we insist on reading Pfi as a “prob-
ability of a state i evolving into state f” then the inter-
ference terms remain classically inexplicable. After all,
routes 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive, so there is no ob-
vious reason why Pfi should depend in any way on such
“mixed” terms. Since equation 2 does not hold, we are
left with interference as the epitome of “quantum weird-
ness” [19].
Our “Γ-rule”, however, provides an equivalent way to
calculate Pfi. We have four possible closed loops,
|i〉 → |1〉 → |f〉 → |1〉 → |i〉,
|i〉 → |2〉 → |f〉 → |2〉 → |i〉,
|i〉 → |1〉 → |f〉 → |2〉 → |i〉,
|i〉 → |2〉 → |f〉 → |1〉 → |i〉, (14)
with the respective probabilities |φfi,1|
2, |φfi,1|
2,
φfi,1φ
∗
fi,2, and φ
∗
fi,1φfi,2. Thus the total probability Pfi
is found to be the same as in equation 13. Perhaps this is
mathematical coincidence, but the presence of the phase
invariant BP-like quantity Γ suggests another explana-
tion. It is natural to conclude from this analysis that
closed loops are in some sense more fundamental than
transitions between states. The authors of [14] hint at
this, but shy away from our hypothesis. Going one step
further, we suggest the following: that in deciding on
the probability of a transition |i〉 to |f〉, one can simply
choose equally (and classically) from all possible closed
loops that contain |i〉 and |f〉. In other words, Pfi can
be considered to be the (classical) sum of four mutu-
ally exclusive alternatives, as opposed to being a sum of
two alternatives with two interference terms tacked on.
The question remains whether these alternatives have
any meaningful philosophical interpretation.
A CLASSICAL ANALOGY
To get the flavor of this idea, consider the following
parable, which is meant to act as an “intuition pump”
[20] (and is not meant to be taken as a literal represen-
tation of QI). A man lives in a house out of town, but
visits town once a day. There is only one viable road
(A) between his house and the town, so his round trip (a
closed loop) is always the same. If we use an asterisk ∗
to denote the road used on his return, then there is only
one possible round trip to consider, AA∗.
Now suppose that a different road (B) is built that
gives the man another way to get to town. In the tradi-
tional language of (quantum) transitions, we would say
that the man’s options have doubled, since there are two
routes (A & B) where before there was one. Within the
conceptual framework of our product of amplitudes (Γ),
however, we see that there are now four possible closed
loops: AA∗, BB∗, AB∗, and BA∗. Let us suppose that
the man chooses among these four possibilities equally
before he sets off on his daily journey. The marginal
probability of AA∗ is now different, since P (AA∗) = 1
4
instead of 1, but there is still no “interference”; the tran-
sition “HOME→ TOWN via A” occurs with probability
1
2
under either interpretation.
Things become more complicated if we split the A road
into subroads 1 and 2, and likewise split B into subroads
2 and 3. In this notation the numbers refer to any of
three gates through which the roads can enter town (gate
2 being common to both roads). We will require that
the man always leave town through the same gate that
he entered; this reduces the number of possible round
trips to six (A1A∗, A2A∗, A2B∗, B2A∗, B2B∗, B3B∗)
and makes tabulations more manageable without loss of
generality.
Now at each gate is a box filled with coins; visitors are
supposed to pay upon entry into town. If our visitor is
diligent (meaning that he always pays a coin upon entry)
then the number of coins in gate box 2 will increase more
rapidly (with each passing day) than the number of coins
in gate boxes 1 or 3. Indeed, a consideration of round
trips indicates that gate 2 is visited with a probability of
2
3
.
The day-to-day behavior of this man would be myste-
rious to an outside observer steeped in quantum ortho-
doxy. Such an observer would notice that gate box 2
gains coins at four times the rate of either of the other
two gate boxes. This contradicts the “quantum transi-
tion” viewpoint, in which one would expect to see coins
increase as binomial coefficients, i.e. 1 in gate box 1, 2
in gate box 3, and 1 in gate box 3. Additionally, if road
B were subsequently closed, an observer would see this
unexpected behavior disappear, since gate boxes 1 and 2
would then gain coins at the same rate (such as in our
less complicated initial example).
4FIG. 1: Schematic representation of a parable which can exhibit interference.
If, however, our observer steps back and considers
round trips (closed loops), then things are more clear.
With both roads open, the observer would note that the
man is simply choosing among six possible round trip al-
ternatives. With each alternative equally likely, gate 2 is
visited two thirds of the time. With one road closed, the
number of round trips is only four, and gates 1 and 2 are
equally likely. The observer concludes there is nothing
mysterious going on; the situation is understandable if
one examines round trips.
To mimic actual destructive interference, we introduce
a rule that lets the traveler distinguish between different
types of round trips. Suppose our visitor is fickle instead
of diligent; he sometimes removes a coin at the gate box
instead of paying. We stipulate the following rules for
the fickle observer:
1. If the man intends to return in exactly the same
way as he came, he adds a coin to the gate box.
2. If the man intends to return in a different way than
he came, he removes a coin.
Under these rules, the man will always pay a coin if he
arrives via gate 1 or gate 3, since he has no choice but
to return by the same way that he came. If he arrives
at gate 2, however, he will take a coin (for the “exotic”
routes A2B∗ and B2A∗) as often as he pays (for the “bor-
ing” routes A2A∗ and B2B∗). On average, therefore, the
number of coins in gate box 2 will stay the same. To
an orthodox observer, this looks like destructive interfer-
ence. Such interference only appears when we make a
distinction between exotic round trips and boring ones:
the journey to town must be different from the journey
back home.
An outside observer would find the fickle man’s behav-
ior inexplicable because of this apparent destructive “in-
Diligent:
Gate Coins
1 1/6
2 2/3
3 1/6
Fickle:
Gate Coins
1 1/2
2 0
3 1/2
FIG. 2: Average number of coins given to each gate per visit,
for a diligent or fickle town visitor. Neither case is explicable
without examining round trips (closed loops).
terference”, a decidedly non-classical phenomenon. But
a closed loop viewpoint leads an observer to decide that
there really isn’t any interference after all; the traveler
is choosing between round trips, and changing his be-
havior based upon whether those round trips are boring
or exotic. In both the diligent and fickle cases it is the
closed loop perspective that makes the data explicable in
classical terms.
While admittedly artificial, this system behaves anal-
ogously to the toy quantum system considered before.
What appears to be “interference”, unexplainable in
terms of a transition HOME→ TOWN, becomes explain-
able and classical if one looks at round trips instead.
QUANTUM DECOHERENCE
Interestingly, a closed loop viewpoint can also provide
insight into the phenomenon of quantum decoherence
[22]. By quantum decoherence we mean the process by
which “mixed” probability terms (such as φfi,1φ
∗
fi,2, and
φ∗fi,1φfi,2) vanish when a system interacts with its envi-
ronment. This is not full-fledged wave function collapse
a` la the Copenhagen interpretation; decoherence (and
its consequence, einselection) produces an effective wave
function collapse [22]. Essentially, the environmental in-
5teraction (a “measurement”) rules out certain “mixed”
amplitudes, and we (macroscopically) see the disappear-
ance of QI.
Consider again the quantum system that evolves from
|i〉 to |f〉 via one of the intermediate states |1〉 or |2〉.
There are two distinct possibilities for state |f〉: either
1. |f〉 does not depend in any way on the intermediate
state by which the system “arrived” at |f〉, or
2. |f〉 does depend upon the intermediate state.
In the first case, all four possible closed loops (denoted by
11∗, 12∗, 21∗, and 22∗) are consistent with time reversal.
There is no contradiction in supposing (for example) that
a system could evolve as |i〉 → |1〉 → |f〉 → |2〉 → |i〉,
since the state |f〉 contains no information about the path
taken. In the second case, however, the “mixed” routes
12∗ and 21∗ lead to time reversal “paradoxes”. A state
|f〉 that has (as one of its properties) information about
how the state was achieved, cannot then evolve back into
state |i〉 via a different path. The only choices then avail-
able are the closed loops 11∗ and 22∗; as a consequence
the QI probability terms have vanished. In effect, the
making of any measurement rules out any “mixed” closed
loops, which do not then enter into any probability cal-
culations.
This is not to say that a measurement (and conse-
quent decoherence) actively changes a state that does not
depend on intermediate states to a different state that
does. Rather, from a many-worlds viewpoint [23],[24] a
measurement rules out the possibility that we are in a
“mixed” state universe. For the above system, if all we
know is that a transition |i〉 → |f〉 takes place, then there
is no way in general to choose among the four possibili-
ties 11∗, 12∗, 21∗, and 22∗; each is equally likely to repre-
sent the universe we are in. But if the state |f〉 depends
in some way upon the path taken, then (upon finding
a state |f〉) we must be in either the “11∗” universe or
the “22∗” universe. Decoherence has been achieved by
a classical selection from available closed loops. In the
language of our parable, the state |f〉 must be executing
a boring round trip since an exotic round trip would lead
to paradox.
POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS
We now make a few remarks regarding this discussion.
Firstly, all quantum transitions can be couched in the lan-
guage of our product of amplitudes (Γ), and this quantity
(like the Berry’s phase) is always phase invariant. There-
fore, regardless of whether or not we believe that the
systems in question are actually traversing closed loops
in time, we have yet another mathematical framework
in which to interpret quantum probabilities. But it is
precisely the invariant nature of Γ that suggests we go
further: it is only through closed loops in time that QI
can be interpreted classically, so perhaps such loops are
important. In the language of the Berry’s phase, per-
haps time itself should be considered a parameter of a
state’s governing Hamiltonian, and probabilities should
be calculated based upon the assumption that all states
eventually “loop back on themselves”.
Of course, treating time this way is problematic, for it
is not obvious what a closed loop in time means. (Indeed,
such a supercyclic time requires us to abandon principles
of causality: future events can be the “cause” of some-
thing in the past [25].) But for visualization purposes,
there is no mathematical difference between a Feynman-
like diagram in which states loop back onto themselves
and a linear diagram that shows states being periodic.
Both evolutions yield identical BP’s and identical Γ’s. In
light of this, we speculate that the appearance of closed
timelike curves [26], [27] in certain solutions to Einstein’s
field equation (such as in the Kerr metric [28]) are not
mere artifacts. Rather, they might be provide evidence
that the closed loop viewpoint of time is not merely a
mathematical convenience, but may have some indepen-
dent significance. This ties in with recent speculation
that the universe itself may be time symmetric on large
(cosmological) scales [29].
Secondly, one may ask how this interpretation differs
from Feynman’s path integral formulation [21] of quan-
tum mechanics. The answer is that it differs only in view-
point. According to the path integral prescription, the
probability amplitude of a particular transition is calcu-
lated by adding up all of the individual amplitudes (his-
tories) that include the initial and final states. There is
no “reason” for this in terms of classical probability, and
to find the probability one must still take the squared
modulus of a (presumably) complex amplitude. In light
of the phase invariant product of amplitudes, however,
we see that there is another viewpoint. We consider as
fundamental not only histories, but futures, and include
all such history/future combinations. When doing this,
“mixed” terms (ostensibly due to interference) are seen to
be (classical) mutually exclusive alternatives. If taken at
face value, this suggests that all states are periodic, in the
sense that all history/future paths are closed. With these
assumptions, classical probability is thereby restored, at
the expense of introducing periodicity to quantum sys-
tems. Whether this is just a mathematical trick, or in-
stead has real philosophical implications, remains an area
for future investigation.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that a Berry’s phase-like quantity, Γ,
can be defined for any quantum system which undergoes
a transition. This product of amplitudes is phase in-
variant, in the sense that it does not matter what phase
6FIG. 3: Two ways to visualize a closed loop in time. The first way , with a forward time t and a “backward time” t∗, seems
nonsensical. The second way is mathematically equivalent.
choices are made for individual kets. We have also shown
how all quantum probabilities can be classically inter-
preted in terms of a sum of Γ’s, regardless of whether or
not we believe that the systems in question are actually
traversing closed loops in time. If we accept such loops,
then quantum interference can be classically interpreted,
and the “mystery” of quantum probabilities is replaced
with the “mystery” of how time can loop back on itself.
If we are uncomfortable with such loops, then the prod-
uct of amplitudes will remain a mathematical curiosity,
and the “mystery” of quantum interference will remain a
subject of debate.
I wish to thank William Hodge, Scott Huffman, and
William Kerr for helpful discussions.
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